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Isolation for Profit:  How Privately 
Provided Video Visitation Services 
Incentivize Bans on In-Person 
Visitation Within American 
Correctional Facilities  
J. Tanner Lusk* 
Abstract 
American correctional facilities are banning in-person 
visitation in lieu of privately provided and expensive video 
visitation services. This Note discusses the types of private services 
provided;  how video visitation negatively affects inmates’ mental 
health and finances;  and the ongoing legal battle occurring in Knox 
County, Tennessee, regarding whether the Knox County Jail’s ban 
on in-person visitation violates the Constitution. Because of the 
significant degree of deference courts grant correctional facilities 
when considering whether challenged regulations violate the 
Constitution, it will be difficult for the Knox County Jail inmates to 
successfully argue that the jail has violated their constitutional 
rights. There are, however, other methods to challenging bans on 
in-person visitation. Through political advocacy, individuals and 
organizations have successfully motivated counties throughout the 
United States to overturn and prohibit bans on in-person visitation. 
Going forward, political advocacy seems like the best method for 
challenging these bans.  
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I. Introduction 
“A new system called ‘video visitation’ is replacing in-person 
jail visits with glitchy, expensive Skype-like video calls. It’s 
inhumane, dystopian and actually increases in-prison violence—
but god, it makes money.”1  
Private companies are increasingly controlling the methods by 
which prisoners communicate with their family and friends.2 
Companies, such as Securus Technologies (Securus), implement 
and manage phone-call systems, electronic messaging systems, 
and video-conferencing systems in correctional facilities.3 
                                                                                                     
 1. Jack Smith, IV, The End of Prison Visitation, MIC (May 5, 2016), 
https://mic.com/articles/142779/the-end-of-prison-visitation#.5J6dSZ78a (last 
updated Sept. 6, 2016) (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (emphasis added) 
[https://perma.cc/2B42-GU43]. 
 2. Id.  
 3. See About Us, SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, https://securustech.net/about-us/ 
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Although these services allow greater access to communication for 
some inmates, in many cases, correctional facilities across the 
nation use this technology to replace in-person visitation.4  
In Knox County, Tennessee, the Knox County Sheriff’s Office 
has banned in-person visitation within its facilities in lieu of video 
visitation.5 As a result of the ban, Knox County’s inmates can only 
visit with friends, family, and others through Securus’s video 
calls.6 Knox County inmates filed a proposed civil rights class 
action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Tennessee on December 23, 2018.7 In the complaint, 
plaintiffs allege that the Knox County Sheriff’s Department 
violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution by “aboli[shing] . . . all in-person 
visitation . . . .”8 This Note considers whether the ban violates the 
Knox County inmates’ constitutional rights and, if litigating the 
constitutional concerns proves to be an insufficient method for 
challenging the bans, whether political advocacy can be a 
successful alternative.  
                                                                                                     
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (“[W]e help maintain relationships between inmates 
and their family and friends through easy to use inmate calling options and video 
visitation from anywhere using Apple® or Android® smartphones, tablets or 
PCs.”) [https://perma.cc/TP8V-VZR8].  
 4. See Debra Weiss, Another Jail Eliminates In-Person Visits and Adopts 
50-Cent-a-Minute Video Visitation, A.B.A. J. (July 24, 2018), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/another_jail_eliminates_free_in_person
_visits_and_adopts_video_visitation (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (“[A]n estimated 
600-plus correctional facilities across the country have implemented some form of 
video calling. About three-quarters of the jails that implement the technology ‘end 
up eliminating or scaling back in-person visits . . . .’”) [https://perma.cc/8Z63-
QVB4]. 
 5. See KNOX COUNTY SHERIFF, POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL ch. 12, at 2 
(“Knox County Correctional Facilities use video visitation as the only method for 
personal visits.”) [hereinafter KNOX COUNTY SHERIFF]. 
 6. See Exhibit 4:  Knox County (TN) Proposed Contract with Securus, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 2, https://static.prisonpolicy.org/messaging/Exhibit4.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (“County hereby contracts with Contractor to provide 
for . . . an Inmate Communication and Management System, 
including . . . Inmate Phone System, Inmate Communications (Kiosks/Tablets), 
Inmate Visitation, [and] Electronic Messaging . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/E7N9-
H9LA].  
 7. Complaint for Plaintiffs, Amble et al. v. Spangler et al., No. 
3:2018cv00538 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 23, 2018).  
 8. Id. at 1.  
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II. Video Visitation Services 
Providing goods and services to prisons is a booming business 
for private companies.9 Ahmad Afzal, owner of Fine Cotton 
Textiles, which manufactures prison jumpsuits, underwear, and 
suicide safety smocks for U.S. prisons, recognized this when he 
stated that “[b]usiness is very good . . . [b]ecause crime is crazy and 
there are lots of inmates. . . . [T]he number of customers is 
increasing every day.”10 Private companies provide services for 
communication,11 medical care,12 food,13 transportation,14 and 
probation.15 This Note focuses on Securus’s video visitation 
services.  
Video visitation allows inmates incarcerated far from home to 
communicate with their family and friends;  bypasses restrictive 
jail visitation hours and policies that can prevent working 
                                                                                                     
 9. See Timothy Williams, The High Cost of Calling the Imprisoned, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2015, § A, at 12 (reporting that the prison phone system is a $1.2 
billion-a-year industry).  
 10. Rupert Neate, Welcome to Jail Inc:  How Private Companies Make Money 
Off U.S. Prisons, THE GUARDIAN (June 16, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/16/us-prisons-jail-private-
healthcare-companies-profit (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7QQ9-
2TEA]. 
 11. See U.S. For-Profit Privatized Correctional Services, PRISON LEGAL NEWS 
(Jan. 2017), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/publications/list-major-profit-
prison-services-and-companies/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (listing Global Tel* 
Link, Securus Technologies, Century Link, Pay Tel, Telmate, NCIC, Consolidated 
Telecom, ICSolutions, Legacy Inmate Communications, IWEBVisit, JPay, 
HomeWAV, Turnkey Corrections, and JailATM as companies that provide 
communication services to prisons) [https://perma.cc/3BK7-3DK5]. 
 12. See id. (listing Corizon Health, Centurion, NaphCare, Correct Care 
Solutions, Wexford Health Sources, Armor Corr. Health Services, Advanced 
Correctional Healthcare, Correctional Medical Care, Southern Health Partners, 
MHM, Cal. Forensic Medical Group, Southwest Correctional Medical Group, CFG 
Health Systems, PrimeCare Medical, Inc., and Correct Health as companies 
providing medical services to prisons). 
 13. See id. (listing Aramark, Canteen Corr. Services, Trinity Services Group, 
ABL Management, and Food Services of America as companies providing food 
services to prisons).  
 14. See id. (listing Transcor, PTS of America, U.S. Prisoner Transport 
Services, Black Talon Enterprises, GEO Transport, and In-Custody 
Transportation as companies providing transportation services to prisons).  
 15. See id. (listing Sentinel Offender Services, Judicial Correctional 
Services, Georgia Probation Services, and CSRA Probation Services as companies 
providing probation services).  
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individuals, school-age children, the elderly, and the disabled from 
visiting;  and reduces the disruptive effect16 that visiting a jail can 
have on children.17 Unfortunately, many correctional facilities 
implementing video visitation policies focus more on generating 
profits than on improving the quality and frequency of 
communication.18  
Securus is one of the leading providers of communication 
systems to correctional facilities.19 Securus provides correctional 
facilities with traditional telephone service,20 video visitation,21 
and electronic messaging.22 Securus installs and manages 
                                                                                                     
 16. See Jasmine M. Hedge, Children of Incarcerated Parents:  The Relation 
of Contact and Visitation to the Parent-Child Relationship and Internalizing and 
Externalizing Problems 30 (May 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Clemson 
University) (on file with Clemson Libraries, Clemson University)  
Visitation policies are often cited as reasons for low rates of visitation, 
as many family members encounter intimidating and uncomfortable 
conditions that deter future contact. . . . [A]dolescents have reported 
mixed feelings about visitation because there was no time to talk 
individually, it involved unpleasant searches, and facilities were 
physically uncomfortable.  
 17. See Bernadette Rabuy & Peter Wagner, Screening Out Family Time—
The For-Profit Video Visitation Industry in Prisons and Jails, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/visitation/report.html 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (listing benefits and drawbacks of video visitation 
services in prisons) [https://perma.cc/Z2H7-QV6Z]. 
 18. See Advocacy Groups Call for End to Ban on In-Person Visits at 
Tennessee Jail, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 8, 2018, at 23 (“It’s all about the 
money.”). 
 19. See About Us, supra note 3 (“[W]e help maintain relationships between 
inmates and their family and friends through easy to use inmate calling options 
and video visitation from anywhere using Apple® or Android® smartphones, 
tablets or PCs.”).  
 20. See Phone Products, SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, 
https://securustech.net/phone-products/index.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) 
(discussing Securus’s phone services) [https://perma.cc/T6SK-GN38].  
 21. See Video Products, SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, 
https://securustech.net/video-products/index.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) 
(“Securus Video Visitation is a fully web-based visitation system that allows 
friends, family members, attorneys, and public officials to schedule and 
participate in video visitation sessions with an inmate—from anywhere with 
internet access using the free Securus app, computer or tablet.”) 
[https://perma.cc/AL2L-H2BH].  
 22. See EMESSEGING, SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, https://securustech.net/ 
emessaging/index.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (providing a way to send 
electronic text messages and photographs to inmates while also allowing the 
inmate an opportunity to reply to the message if the sender attaches a return 
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communication systems in correctional facilities without any 
charge to the facility.23 The inmates pay to use Securus’s services,24 
and the facilities housing the inmates receive lucrative25 
commissions.26  
In addition to commissions, Securus’s communication systems 
also provide convenience to correctional facilities.27 The systems 
allow facilities to provide communication between inmates and the 
inmates’ families and friends while decreasing visitation traffic.28 
Correctional facilities claim that decreasing visitation traffic 
increases internal security and reduces staff needs.29  
To increase revenue, Securus has, in the past, included 
provisions in its contracts that required prisons to ban in-person 
                                                                                                     
stamp) [https://perma.cc/BWZ2-2ZHA]. 
 23. See SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL—170423 BAFO—
VIDEO VISITATION PINAL COUNTY, AZ 6–7 (2017), 
http://www.pinalcountyaz.gov/Purchasing/Lists/ContractVendors/Attachments/4
58/Securus%20Technologies%20Contract.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) 
(“[Securus] will provide all supervision, labor, materials, equipment, software, 
storage, documentation, training, technical support, and supplies necessary to 
furnish, install, implement, operate, and maintain our Web-based video visitation 
system at no cost to Pinal County.”) [https://perma.cc/J9UQ-H6K8]. 
 24. See Video Visitation, SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, 
https://securustech.net/video-products/video-visitation/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2019) (listing “funding options” to use Securus Video Visitation) 
[https://perma.cc/P6TD-AXV5]. 
 25. See Smith, supra note 1 (“These deals are lucrative:  In Los Angeles 
County, for example, it brings in a baseline, contractual guarantee of $15 million 
a year.”).  
 26. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, TO WHAT END?:  ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE 
KNOX COUNTY JAIL’S BAN ON IN-PERSON VISITS 2 (2018), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1H4JdRulGhQ9tKeMKUxsimxLsyE5nYlMF/view 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019)  
Under the County’s current contract with Securus Technologies, the 
County takes a 50% “commission” on every remote video call, which 
goes into the County’s general revenue fund. Because Securus pays the 
full cost of installing and operating the system, there is no need for the 
county to charge an extra fee.  
[https://perma.cc/9ZLA-X98R].  
 27. See id. (introducing reasons for the changes implemented by the Knox 
County Sheriff’s office). 
 28. See id. (“When the ban was initiated, the Sheriff’s Office gave the 
following reasons for eliminating in-person visits:  Decreased visitation traffic—
requires less staff . . . .”).  
 29. See id. (stating that because of the ban no contraband would enter the 
jail and that the chances for violence would be lessened).  
ISOLATION FOR PROFIT 345 
visitation.30 In a report by the Prison Policy Initiative, the 
organization stated that the following provision was a common 
element of Securus’s contracts:  “For non-professional visitors, 
Customer will eliminate all face to face visitation through glass or 
otherwise at the Facility and will utilize video visitation for all 
non-professional on-site visitors.”31 On May 6, 2015, Securus 
announced that it would no longer explicitly require county jails 
and state prisons to replace in-person visitation with video calls.32  
Additionally, Securus has also included provisions in contracts 
that detail commission rate increases that are conditional on the 
prison meeting agreed-to-quotas.33 For instance, in a contract with 
Maricopa County, Arizona, Securus included a provision that 
stated the following: 
 
Contractor shall provide an initial revenue share of ten percent 
(10%) of gross revenues per month upon implementation of the 
base Video Visitation System if the County reaches a minimum 
usage rate of 8,000 paid visits for the given month. Upon 
Contractor realizing $2,603,201.95 in gross revenue, as verified 
by electronic tracking of visit usage times the visitation rate, 
the revenue percentage shall increase to twenty percent (20%) 
of gross revenue per month, regardless of visitation volume. The 
                                                                                                     
 30. See Securus Ends Its Ban on In-Person Visits, Shifts Responsibility to 
Sheriffs, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 6, 2015), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/05/06/securus-ends-ban/ (last visited Nov. 
24, 2019) (“There is clear language banning in-person visits in 70% of the Securus 
contracts we examined for our report . . .  .”) [https://perma.cc/56Z4-Y26X]. 
 31. Rabuy & Wagner, supra note 17.  
 32. See Securus Technologies Revises Video Visitation Policy—Defers to 
Prison/Jail Officials on Rules for Onsite Visits, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 4, 
2015, 6:22 PM), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/securus_technologies_revises_video_visitatio
n_policy-defers_to_prison-jail_officials_on_rules_for.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 
2019)  
Securus examined our contract language for video visitation and 
found . . . we were writing in language that could be perceived as 
restricting . . . person-to-person contact . . . . So we are eliminating 
that language and 100% deferring to the rules that each facility has 
for video use by inmates. 
[https://perma.cc/JNS9-8FBS].  
 33. See Exhibit 2:   Maricopa County Video Visitation Contract, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE 15, https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7520964282.pdf (last updated Nov. 6, 
2013) (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (detailing the commission structure for revene 
generation) [https://perma.cc/4QNF-LH9S].  
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parties agree that the set commission rates shall be periodically 
reviewed in relation to the actual visitation volume and gross 
revenue and may be adjusted by mutual written consent.34 
 
Provisions such as this provide jails with financial incentives 
to curtail in-person visitation in lieu of video visitation.  
Because of a desire to increase facility security and produce 
revenue, some facilities have completely banned in-person 
visitation in lieu of visitation solely through video visitation, 
provided by Securus and similar providers.35 Currently, 600 
correctional facilities in forty-six states have implemented some 
sort of video visitation system, and each year, more of those 
facilities ban in-person visitation.36 The Prison Policy Initiative 
reported that as of 2015, of the jails that implemented video 
visitation within their facilities, seventy-four percent of those jails 
banned in-person visitation.37  
Currently, the constitutionality of blanket-bans on in-person 
visitation is being litigated in Knox County, Tennessee.38  
III. Knox County Jail 
Knox County Jail, located in Knox County, Tennessee, houses 
approximately 1000 inmates.39 In April 2014, Knox County 
eliminated in-person visitation between inmates and outside 
visitors.40 In place of in-person visitation, Knox County 
                                                                                                     
 34. Id.  
 35. See Weiss, supra note 4 (“Lucius Couloute, an expert at the Prison Policy 
Initiative, told Ars Technica and the Guardian that . . . 600-plus correctional 
facilities . . . have implemented some form of video calling. About three-quarters 
of the jails . . . end up eliminating or scaling back in-person visits .  . .  .’”). 
 36. See Smith, supra note 1 (discussing the trend of correctional facilities 
implementing video visitation technology). 
 37. See Rabuy & Wagner, supra note 17 (“The record is not always clear 
about whether the jails or the companies drive this change, but by banning 
in-person visits, it is clear that the jails are abandoning their commitment to 
correctional best practices.”). 
 38.  Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7. 
 39. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (“With a population of about 
1000 inmates at the Detention Facility, this means there are, on average, ten 
more assaults every month.”). 
 40. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2 (“Since April 2014, the Knox 
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implemented a video conference system, which Securus installed 
and manages.41 
Inmates who wish to visit with family and friends must use 
Securus’s video conference system.42 Inmates can use the system 
in two ways.43 First, those who choose to communicate with the 
inmate can drive to the Knox County Jail and use a kiosk within 
the jail to video call the inmate for free.44 Second, those who choose 
to communicate with the inmate can remotely call the inmate at a 
cost of $5.99 for fifteen minutes.45 In addition to video-calling, 
inmates may also use tablets provided by Knox County Jail to 
message and email others.46 Inmates may either purchase the 
tablet for $425,  rent it for five dollars per day,  or borrow it for 
fifteen minutes at no charge.47 
The Knox County Jail says that its primary reason for banning 
in-person visitation is its concern over safety within the facility, 
but opponents of the ban argue that the primary motivation of the 
county is to make money.48 For every fifteen-minute remote video 
call, Knox County pockets $2.62 of the $5.99 charge as a 
                                                                                                     
County Sheriff’s Office has banned in-person visits at all county jail facilities.”). 
 41. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2 (“Because Securus pays the 
full cost of installing and operating the system, there is no need for the county to 
charge an extra fee.”).  
 42. See KNOX COUNTY SHERIFF, supra note 5, at 2 (“Knox County Correctional 
Facilities use video visitation as the only method for personal visits.”). 
 43. See KNOX COUNTY SHERRIF, supra note 5, at 2 (detailing different ways 
video visitation can be used). 
 44. See KNOX COUNTY SHERRIF, supra note 5, at 2 (stating that visitors can 
utilize kiosks for personal video visitation at no charge). 
 45. See KNOX COUNTY SHERRIF, supra note 5, at 2 (“There is a charge of $5.99 
per thirty (30) minute visit.”). 
 46. See Knox County Commission Passes Resolution to Supply Inmates with 
Tablets, WVLT (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.wvlt.tv/content/news/Knox-County-
Commission-passes-resolution-to-supply-inmates-with-tablets-420077863.html 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Knox County Commission Resolution) 
(discussing Knox County’s purchase of 900 tablets, how the county intended to 
use the tablets, and the public’s response to the purchase) 
[https://perma.cc/VKV5-V39K].  
 47. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 11 (“Inmates get 15 minutes 
a day with the tablets unless they have a gold pass, but gold passes cost $5.99 a 
day.”). 
 48. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2 (“[T]he video call system 
makes money for the County, while in-person visits do not.”). 
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“commission.”49 From March 2014 to November 2017, Knox County 
earned $68,777.00 from the “commissions.”50 In total, over the past 
four years, remote visits have brought in $164,000 in total 
revenue.51 Of that $164,000, $79,000 went to Knox County and the 
rest went to Securus.52  
Knox County has not provided data that supports its 
argument that the ban would increase the jail’s security. Knox 
County stated that banning in-person visitation would decrease 
visitation traffic, which would reduce the amount of staff needed 
at the facility;  reduce the amount of contraband entering the 
facility;  and reduce the risk of violence in the facility.53  
Face to Face Knox, “a grass-roots coalition of citizens in Knox 
County who seek just and humane treatment for incarcerated 
individuals at the Knox County jail,”54 published a report on 
January 29, 2018, To What End? Assessing the Impact of the Knox 
County Jail’s Ban on In-Person Visits.55 In its report, Face to Face 
Knox found that the potential benefits bolstered by the Knox 
County Jail had not occurred and stated that “[t]he ban on 
in-person visits makes the jail more dangerous, does nothing to 
stop the flow of contraband, and strips money away from the 
pockets of families.”56 The report found that contraband coming 
into the jail had not decreased, that assaults had increased among 
the 1000 inmates by an average of ten assaults per month, and 
that the rate of disciplinary infractions had increased.57  
                                                                                                     
 49. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 14 (discussing the financial 
details of the ban).  
 50. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 14 (outlining the 
profitability of the program at paragraph 74). 
 51. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 14 (“[M]ore than $164,000 
in total revenue of the past four years . . .”). 
 52. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 14 (“About $79,000.00 went 
back into county coffers and the rest into profits for provider Securus 
Technologies.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 53. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2 (listing some reasons the 
Knox County Sheriff’s Office eliminated in-person visitation). 
 54. Face to Face Knox (@F2FKnox), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/f2fknox 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/36L9-REJR].  
 55. FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26.  
 56. FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2. 
 57. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing Face to Face 
Knox’s contrary findings). 
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On December 23, 2018, Knox County inmates filed a proposed 
civil rights class action lawsuit in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Tennessee.58 The plaintiffs allege that 
the Knox County Sheriff’s Department violated the First, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution regarding 
“its abolition of all in-person visitation . . . .”59  
In the complaint’s statement of facts, plaintiffs stated that 
their friends and family members are forced to use kiosks if they 
wish to communicate with the inmate at the jail;  that remote video 
calls cost $5.99 for fifteen minutes;  that it is difficult to get access 
to a kiosk;  and that the kiosks are prone to technical issues such 
as a blurry screen, loss of video feed, and communication ending 
prematurely without providing a refund to the inmate for time not 
used.60  
In the plaintiffs’ claim for relief, under Count One, the 
plaintiffs claim that ending in-person visitation in lieu of Knox 
County Jail’s “pay to view” policy violates plaintiffs’ rights under 
the Fourteenth, First, and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution.61 First, the plaintiffs claim that they have a 
constitutional right to in-person visitation.62 Second, the plaintiffs 
claim that the ban violates the inmates’ First Amendment right of 
intimate association and is not reasonably related to a valid 
penological objective.63 Third, the plaintiffs claim that the 
defendants’ “arbitrary” ban on in-person visitation between 
inmates and their family, friends, and employers violates the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
                                                                                                     
 58. Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7.  
 59. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 1–2 (outlining the class 
action generally).  
 60. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 7–13 (compiling statements 
from Knox County inmates regarding the shortcomings of video communication 
technology at Knox County Jail).  
 61. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 22 (“The in-person 
visitation ban violates the substantive due process mandate of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the First and Eighth 
Amendments as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 62. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 22 (outlining the inmates 
claim for relief first as a violation of a constitutional right to personal visitation). 
 63. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 23 (“The ban on in-person 
visitation .   . is not reasonably related to a valid penological objective.”). 
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punishment.64 Plaintiffs allege that the ban makes it difficult to 
maintain relationships, which results in higher recidivism rates, 
and that it is a “dramatic departure from accepted standards of 
confinement.”65  
In the plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief, they request a declaration 
that the defendants’ policies, practices, and customs violate the 
United States Constitution;  a finding that as a direct and 
proximate result of defendants’ actions and inactions, plaintiffs 
have suffered injuries entitling them to declaratory relief against 
defendants;  an injunction directing the defendants to end the ban 
on in-person visitation within its facility;  and an award of 
nominal, punitive, and compensatory damages.66 
IV. Burdens on Inmates and Their Families 
Before addressing the constitutional issues discussed in the 
plaintiffs’ proposed class action lawsuit, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at the consequences that bans have on inmates’ mental 
health and finances. 
A. Mental Burdens 
In the proposed class action lawsuit, plaintiff Alonzo Hoskins 
stated that his mental health has deteriorated since being 
incarcerated at the Knox County Jail.67 He stated that before 
incarceration he never used psychiatric medications, but now he 
does.68 He blames the deterioration on being “cut off from his 
family” and the living conditions at the Knox County Jail.69 In 
                                                                                                     
 64. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 23 (introducing the inmate’s 
allegation of cruel and unusual punishment). 
 65. Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 23. 
 66. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 33–35 (listing requests). 
 67. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the mental 
and physical deterioration of Alonzo Hoskins).  
 68. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 8 (“He never took 
psychiatric medications before, but now he does.”). 
 69. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the stress 
experienced by Alonzo Hoskins). 
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addition to his mental-health issues, Alonzo has lost weight, lost 
hair, and experienced difficulty sleeping.70  
The effects on Alonzo’s and others’ mental health should come 
as no surprise. Psychologists have found that video visitation is 
inferior to in-person visitation regarding the quality of interaction 
between the participants.71 Video visitation falls short in six key 
aspects.72 First, video calls increase the formality of the 
conversation between participants, regardless of their 
relationship.73 This means that participants are more likely to talk 
at one another, rather than engage in a natural conversation.74 
Second, visual signals that facilitate understanding between 
participants, such as head nods, eye contact, and facial 
expressions, are harder to recognize during video calls.75  
Third, the process of establishing trust takes longer during 
video communication than it would during in-person 
communication.76 This is especially detrimental when the inmate 
is communicating with doctors or young children.77 Fourth, there 
is an absence of mutual eye contact, which interferes with 
                                                                                                     
 70. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 8 (describing the nature of 
Alonzo Hoskins’s decline). 
 71. See Emily Widra, Seeing Eye to Eye:  Understanding the Limits of Video 
Visitation, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 11, 2016), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2016/04/11/eye-contact/ (last visited Nov. 24, 
2019) (“While there are benefits to video communication, primarily regarding 
long-distance communication, psychologists have repeatedly found numerous 
differences between face-to-face and video communication.”) 
[https://perma.cc/LLK9-T4DU]. 
 72. See id. (listing the ways in which video visitation falls short). 
 73. See id. (“Video communication increases the formality of the 
conversation . . . .”). 
 74. See id. (“[P]eople are more likely to be talking at one another when they 
are using video technology rather than having a more natural conversation.”). 
 75. See id. (“[V]isual signals that facilitate listener understanding. . . . such 
as head nods, eye contact, and facial expressions, are key to in-person interactions 
but are difficult to recognize in video communication.”). 
 76. See id. ([T]rust takes longer via video communication than in face-to-face 
conversations . .  . .”). 
 77. See id. (“This is especially worrisome . . . between incarcerated people 
and doctors (tele-medicine) as well as between incarcerated parents and their 
young children.”);  see also Rabuy & Wagner, supra note 17 (“Video visitation can 
add to the already significant trauma that children of incarcerated parents face, 
especially for young children who are unfamiliar with the video technology.”). 
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communication and reduces conversation fluidity.78 Fifth, video 
communication deters participants’ willingness to express 
intimacy and social connection.79 Sixth, the reduced content and 
process coordination in video communication leads to quicker 
conversations, reduced interactivity, and less complex 
utterances.80 
These differences between video visitation and in-person 
visitation are significant considering the impact that in-person 
visitation has on the inmate’s rehabilitation process and 
recidivism rate.81 A study by the Minnesota Department of 
Corrections found that “visits from family and friends offer a 
means of establishing, maintaining, or enhancing social support 
networks.”82 The study found that improving social bonds for 
incarcerated offenders is important because it helps “prevent them 
from assuming a criminal identity” and because “many released 
prisoners rely on family and friends for employment opportunities, 
financial assistance, and housing.”83 The improvement of these 
social bonds reduces the inmate’s recidivism rate, meaning that 
the more visits that someone receives in prison, the less likely he 
is to commit another crime upon release.84  
                                                                                                     
 78. See Wildra, supra note 71 (“The absence of mutual eye contact and a 
shared visual field disrupts communication and decreases conversation 
fluidity . . .”). 
 79. See Wildra, supra note 71 (“[I]t is more difficult for people to express 
intimacy and social connection with video communication.”). 
 80. See Wildra, supra note 71 (“The decreased content and process 
coordination in video communication leads to shorter conversations, reduced 
interactivity, and less complex utterances.”) (citations omitted). 
 81. See generally MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., THE EFFECTS OF PRISON VISITATION 
ON OFFENDER RECIDIVISM (2011), https://mn.gov/doc/assets/11-
11MNPrisonVisitationStudy_tcm1089-272781.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) 
(presenting findings on the effects of visitation on prisoner recidivism rates) 
[https://perma.cc/3AJ5-4465].  
 82. Id. at 1. 
 83. Id. at 2.  
 84. See id. at 29 (“[F]indings suggest that prison visitation can improve 
recidivism outcomes by helping offenders not only maintain social ties with both 
nuclear and extended family . . . while incarcerated, but also by developing new 
bonds such as those with clergy or mentors.”). 
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In his dissent in Kentucky Department of Corrections v. 
Thompson,85 Justice Marshall recognized the significant effect that 
visitation has on recidivism:  
Confinement without visitation “brings alienation and the 
longer the confinement the greater the alienation. There is 
little, if any, disagreement that the opportunity to be visited by 
friends and relatives is more beneficial to the confined person 
than any other form of communication. 
“Ample visitation rights are also important for the family and 
friends of the confined person. . . . Preservation of the family 
unit is important to the reintegration of the confined person and 
decreases the possibility of recidivism upon 
release. . . . [V]isitation has demonstrated positive effects on a 
confined person’s ability to adjust to life while confined as well 
as his ability to adjust to life upon release . . . .”86 
 Testimony from those burdened by bans on in-person 
visitation add additional weight to the scientific findings.87 When 
asked about the effects of an in-person visitation ban at the Travis 
County Correctional Facility in Texas, inmates stated that when 
using video call systems they cannot look the other participant in 
the eye because “[i]t’s impossible” and the “personal, intimate 
aspects” of their loved ones do not show.88 Lauren Johnson, a 
visitor to the Travis County Correctional Facility, stated, “[i]t’s not 
something you can quantify. Eye contact is a huge deal. It’s 
blowing them kisses and putting your hands to the glass. The kids 
get lost with the video terminals. It’s just not the same experience. 
It’s a disconnected feeling.”89 Susan Gregory, wife to an inmate in 
                                                                                                     
 85. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 465 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Kentucky regulations did not give state inmates a 
liberty interest in visitation that is entitled to the protections of the due process 
clause) (quoting National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
Model Sentencing and Corrections Act § 4–115, cmt. (1979)). 
 86. Id.  at 468 (quoting National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act § 4–115, cmt. (1979)).  
 87. See Emily Wildra, In Their Own Words:  The Value of In-Person 
Visitation to Families, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/05/09/video-visitation-quotes/ (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2019) (providing quotes from inmates and their loved ones on the 
value of in-person visitation) [https://perma.cc/A5HG-SAMA]. 
 88. See id. (describing the difficulties associated with video visitation 
between prisoners and visitors). 
 89. Id.  
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the Travis County facility stated, “Even if it’s through plexiglass, 
at least you can have some kind of live interaction with your loved 
one. That would have made it better for me and him to maintain 
that human contact.”90  
B. Financial Burdens 
Use of Securus’s technology and services can be costly for 
inmates and their families. At the Knox County Jail, one hour of 
remote visitation every week for one year costs the visitor 
$1246.00.91 Visitation is free if visitors use one of the kiosks located 
inside of the jail, but that is not always an available or practical 
option.92 Experienced Skype and Facetime users, who were 
familiar with video calling, commented in an interview with the 
Prison Policy Initiative that, while using Securus’s kiosks, they 
have experienced the kiosks’ video feed freezing and becoming 
blurry, video calls’ audio cutting in and out, and video calls ending 
prematurely.93 As Ashika Coleman, an inmate located in Travis 
County, Texas, heartbreakingly put it, “[i]t’s just too much 
frustration to come down here, wait for an hour and then only get 
25 minutes for a not-so-good call. I think the hassle is why people 
don’t visit me as much anymore.”94  
Prisoners can also use tablets to communicate, but in order to 
get actual value out of the tablet, the prisoner must either 
purchase the tablet for $42595 or rent it for $5.00 a day.96 Prisoners 
                                                                                                     
 90. Id.  
 91. Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 14 (“One hour of remote 
visitation of every week for one year, costs $1246.00 to the visitor.”).  
 92. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 11 (outlining the prohibitive 
cost of tablet use). 
 93. See Rabuy & Wagner, supra note 17 (“Video visitation is not ready for 
prime time.”).  
 94. Zoe Erler, The Upside (And Downside) of Video Visitation, PRISON 
FELLOWSHIP (May 12, 2016), https://www.prisonfellowship.org/2016/05/upside-
downside-video-visitation/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3PTG-
BGG6].  
 95. See Knox County Commission Resolution, supra note 46 (“The tablets will 
be provided to inmates to give them a communication and management system. 
Tablets will be sold to inmates at the cost of $425.”).  
 96. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 11 (“[G]old passes [allowing 
the inmate to rent the tablet used for visitation] cost $5.00 a day.”).  
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can also borrow tablets for free, but they are limited to fifteen 
minutes a day.97 Prisoners complain that it is difficult to obtain 
tablets and that fifteen minutes is not long enough, but they cannot 
afford to pay $5.00 a day to rent a tablet.98 
Because of the burdens on the wellbeing and finances of 
inmates and their families, it is necessary that people challenge 
bans on in-person visitation. Two available pathways for 
challenging these bans are through litigation addressing 
constitutional concerns and political advocacy.  
V. Constitutional Arguments 
In their proposed class action civil rights lawsuit against Knox 
County Jail, plaintiffs claim the ban on in-person visitation 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process 
mandate;  the First Amendment’s right to intimate association;  
and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment.99  
In the following sections, this Note discusses the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s substantive due process mandate, whether there is 
a fundamental right to prisoner visitation that falls within the 
scope of the substantive due process mandate, and whether Knox 
County Jail’s ban on in-person visitation violates the Constitution. 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process 
Mandate 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides 
that “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of the law.”100 The Supreme Court’s 
interprets the Fourteenth Amendment as providing two different 
                                                                                                     
 97. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 11 (“Inmates get 15 minutes 
a day with the tablets . . . .”). 
 98. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 11 (outlining the prohibitive 
cost of tablet use). 
 99. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 22–23 (alleging Counts 1 
and 2, which describe violations of the Fourteenth, First, and Eighth 
Amendments).  
 100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
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kinds of constitutional protection:  procedural due process and 
substantive due process.101 
Substantive due process protects rights that are considered 
“fundamental,” which are rights that are “implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty.”102 The Supreme Court has determined that 
“most—but not all—of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights 
are fundamental . . . .”103 The Court has also determined that some 
unenumerated rights are fundamental.104 
If the Court finds that a right merits substantive due process 
protection, then the right is “protected ‘against certain government 
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to 
implement them.’”105 This approach “forbids the government to 
infringe . . . ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all . . . unless the 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.”106 If, however, an individual claims that the government 
has interfered with a right of the individual and the right is not 
considered a fundamental right, courts look at whether the 
government had a legitimate government purpose in creating its 
policy and whether the policy was rationally related to the 
purpose.107  
                                                                                                     
 101. See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of [the Due Process Clause] explicates that the 
amendment provides two different kinds of constitutional protection:  procedural 
due process and substantive due process.”). 
 102. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937) (“[I]mmunities 
that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of 
particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against 
the states.”).  
 103. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556.  
 104. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)  
[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates 
most of the Bill of Rights against the States. It is tempting . . . to 
suppose that liberty encompasses no more than those rights already 
guaranteed . . . by the express provisions of the first eight 
Amendments . . . . this Court has never accepted that view.  
(citations omitted). 
 105. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (citing 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).  
 106. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (citing Collins v. Harker Heights, 
503 U.S. 115 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987));  see also 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (outlining strict scrutiny analysis).  
 107. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) 
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B. Is There a Fundamental Right to Prisoner Visitation? 
In Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, the Supreme 
Court stated that inmates do not possess a due process right to 
“unfettered visitation.”108 More recently, in Overton v. Bazzetta,109 
the Court stated: 
 
We do not hold, and we do not imply, that any right to intimate 
association is altogether terminated by incarceration or is 
always irrelevant to claims made by prisoners. We need not 
attempt to explore or define the asserted right of association at 
any length or determine the extent to which it survives 
incarceration because the challenged regulations bear a 
rational relation to legitimate penological interests.110 
 
In his treatise, Rights of Prisoners, Michael Mushlin, professor 
of law at Pace University, interprets the above quotations from 
Thompson and Overton as begging the question of whether there 
is a fundamental right, “not to ‘unfettered visitation’ but, rather, 
to a program of reasonable visitation.”111 Professor Mushlin lists 
several “solid foundations” on which to construct a constitutional 
right to prison visitation.112  
Professor Mushlin claims that the right to visitation may exist 
“as an independent fundamental constitutional right under the 
First Amendment . . . .”113 Mushlin points out that the Supreme 
Court has recognized that the states are forbidden to unreasonably 
                                                                                                     
(discussing rational basis review and finding that the challenged regulation had 
no rational relation to the government’s objective, and therefore, it was beyond 
constitutional bounds).  
 108. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (“Respondents 
do not argue—nor can it seriously be contended, in light of our prior cases—that 
an inmate’s interest in unfettered visitation is guaranteed directly by the Due 
Process Clause.”).  
 109. Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133–37 (2003) (finding that the prison 
regulations satisfy the Turner v. Safley Test and do not violate the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 110. Id. at 131–32.  
 111. 3 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 13:2 (5th ed. 2018) 
(quoting Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)).  
 112. See id. § 13:3 (introducing visitation as an independent fundamental 
constitutional right). 
 113. Id. 
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interfere with family relationships;114 that an unwed father has a 
right to a hearing before termination of his parental rights;115 that 
states cannot prohibit married individuals from using 
contraceptives;116  and that there is a right of association grounded 
in the free speech clause,117 which includes the “right to come 
together for the purposes of expressing ideas”118 and which may be 
“broad enough to encompass meetings and communications 
between family and friends.”119 Professor Mushlin argues that case 
law supports the proposition that “the state cannot, without some 
justification, impose governmental policies that have the effect of 
weakening family and social relationships[,]”120 and that within 
the fundamental right to privacy in family relationships, there 
could be an independent fundamental right to visitation.121  
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Overton to avoid 
explicitly declaring that there is a fundamental right to 
visitation,122 and the Court’s hesitance to expand the collection of 
                                                                                                     
 114. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1974) (“Our 
decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family 
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down 
many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”). 
 115. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (“Illinois parents are 
constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are 
removed from their custody. It follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and 
those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary 
to the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 116. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“We deal with a 
right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights . . . . Marriage is a coming together 
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being 
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life . . . .”). 
 117. See MUSHLIN, supra note 111, § 13:3 (“The Court also has recognized a 
right of association grounded in the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.” 
(citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958))). 
 118. MUSHLIN, supra note 111, § 13:3 (citing De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 
(1937)). 
 119. MUSHLIN, supra note 111, § 13:3 (citing Mayo v. Lane, 867 F.2d 374, 375 
(7th Cir. 1989)).  
 120. MUSHLIN, supra note 111, § 13:3. 
    121.  See MUSHLIN, supra note 111, §13:3 (“Thus, there is strong analytical 
support for an independent constitutional entitlement found in the fundamental 
constitutional right to privacy in family relationships that is implicated when 
prisoners seek to visit their families.”). 
 122. See Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (“We need not attempt to 
explore or define the asserted right of association at any length . . . .”). 
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fundamental rights,123 it is unlikely that the Court will determine 
that there is a fundamental right to visitation. Regardless of 
whether there is a fundamental right to visitation as an extension 
of the First Amendment right to association or not, the Court 
applies rational basis review,124 which gives significant deference 
to the government.125  
The Supreme Court has required that when a prison policy 
allegedly violates the First Amendment or the substantive due 
process mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, the government’s 
policy only has to be rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest to survive the challenge.126 When determining whether 
the government has unconstitutionally infringed on a prisoners’ 
access to visitation, the Court applies either the Turner v. Safley127 
test (in the case of convicted detainees) or the Bell v. Wolfish128 test 
(in the case of pretrial detainees).  
 
                                                                                                     
 123. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“[T]he 
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process 
because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are 
scarce and open-ended. . . . [J]udicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the 
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.”) (citations 
omitted).  
 124. See Overton, 539 U.S. at 131–32 (2003) (“We need not attempt to explore 
or define the asserted right of association at any length or determine the extent 
to which it survives incarceration because the challenged regulations bear a 
rational relation to legitimate penological interests.”). 
 125. Id. at 132 (“We must accord substantial deference to the professional 
judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for 
defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most 
appropriate means to accomplish them.”).  
 126. See id. at 131–32 (“We need not attempt to explore or define the asserted 
right of association at any length or determine the extent to which it survives 
incarceration because the challenged regulations bear a rational relation to 
legitimate penological interests.”). 
 127. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99–100 (1987) (finding that the prison 
regulation on correspondence was constitutionally valid and the regulation 
prohibiting an inmate’s right to marry was unconstitutional). 
 128. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520–22 (1979) (finding that the prison’s 
“double-bunking” practice and the “publisher-only” rule were constitutionally 
valid). 
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C. Does Knox County’s Ban on In-Person Visitation Violate Either 
the Turner v. Safley Test or Bell v. Wolfish Test?  
1. Turner v. Safley Test 
The Supreme Court has stated that when a prison regulation 
interferes with a convicted detainee’s constitutional rights, “the 
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”129 When determining whether a prison 
regulation violates a convicted detainee’s rights that are protected 
by either the First Amendment or the substantive due process 
mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts apply the factors 
stated in Turner v. Safley.130  
In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court formulated “a 
standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims that is 
responsive both to ‘the policy of judicial restraint regarding 
prisoner complaints and to the need to protect constitutional 
rights.’”131 The Court listed factors relevant in determining the 
reasonableness of a prison regulation.132 First, “there must be a 
‘valid rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the 
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.”133 A 
regulation cannot stand where the connection between the 
regulation and the asserted goal is “so remote as to render the 
policy arbitrary or irrational.”134 The governmental objective must 
also be “a legitimate and neutral one.”135  
Second, courts must determine whether there are alternative 
means to exercising the asserted right.136 In determining whether 
                                                                                                     
 129. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.  
 130. See Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (“In Turner we held that 
four factors are relevant in deciding whether a prison regulation affecting a 
constitutional right that survives incarceration withstands constitutional 
challenge . . . .”).  
 131. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406 
(1974)).  
 132. See id. at 89 (“As our opinions in Pell, Bell, and Jones show, several 
factors are relevant in determining the reasonableness of the regulation at 
issue.”).  
 133. Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).  
 134. Id. at 89–90.  
 135. Id. at 90.  
 136. See id. (“A second factor relevant in determing the reasonableness of a 
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there are alternative means available to inmates for exercising a 
constitutional right, the court is only concerned with whether some 
alternative means exists, not with whether the alternative means 
are ideal.137 Where there are alternative means, “courts should be 
particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to 
corrections officials in gauging the validity of the regulation.’”138 
Third, courts must consider “the impact accommodation of the 
asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other 
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.”139 If 
the accommodation of an asserted right would have a significant 
“ripple effect” on other inmates or prison staff, courts should be 
“particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections 
officers.”140  
Fourth, the courts should consider whether there is evidence 
of “ready alternatives,” which can suggest whether the regulation 
is reasonable or not.141 If an inmate can point to an “alternative 
that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to 
the penological interests,” a court can consider that as evidence 
that the regulation is unreasonable.142 
The Supreme Court has not applied the Turner v. Safley test 
to determine whether a blanket prohibition on in-person visitation 
violates the constitutional rights of affected prisoners. In Overton 
v. Bazzetta, the Supreme Court applied the factors discussed in 
Turner to determine whether a prison’s regulation placing 
restrictions on visitation violated the First Amendment’s right of 
association and the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due 
process mandate.143 In Overton, the Michigan Department of 
Corrections promulgated regulations limiting visitors after an 
                                                                                                     
prison restriction, as Pell shows, is whether there are alternative means of 
exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.”). 
 137. See Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003) (specifying what the 
court is to focus on).  
 138. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 
U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).  
 139. Id. at 90. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. (“[T]he absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the 
reasonableness of a prison regulation.”).  
 142. Id. at 91. 
 143. See Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132–36 (2003) (outlining and 
applying the four factors from Turner). 
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increase in visitation and substance abuse.144 Visitors, other than 
clergy and attorneys, had to be included on an approved list.145 
Minor children that were not either a child, step-child, grandchild, 
or sibling of the inmate could not be included on the approved 
list.146 Former inmates could also not be put on the approved list 
unless they were an immediate family member of the inmate and 
had approval from the facility’s warden.147 Prisoners who had two 
or more substance-abuse violations were not allowed any visitors 
other than clergy and attorneys, but could apply for visitation 
privileges after two years.148  
Prisoners sued the prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 
that visitation restrictions violated the First and Eighth 
Amendments through the Fourteenth Amendment.149 The United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan agreed 
with the prisoners and concluded that the visitation restrictions 
violated the constitutional rights of Michigan prisoners because 
“[e]ven under the most deferential review, these restrictions are 
not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”150 The 
Sixth Circuit affirmed.151  
The Supreme Court reversed and found that each factor of the 
Turner test weighed in favor of the government.152 First, the Court 
found that the regulations had a rational relation to the facility’s 
legitimate penological interest in maintaining internal security 
because the prison regulations were aimed at promoting internal 
security, which the Court stated, was the “most legitimate of 
                                                                                                     
 144. See id. at 129 (“[P]rison officials found it more difficult to maintain order 
during visitation and to prevent smuggling or trafficking in drugs.”). 
 145. See id. (discussing who was and who was not allowed to visit prisoners).  
 146. See id. at 126 (“[M]inor children are not permitted to visit unless they 
are the children, stepchildren, grandchildren, or siblings of the inmate . . . .”). 
 147. See id. (“[F]ormer prisoners are not permitted to visit except that a 
former prisoner who is an immediate family member of an inmate may visit if the 
warden approves.”). 
 148. See id. (distinguishing prisoners with two or more substance-abuse 
violations).  
 149. Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 148 F. Supp. 2d. 813 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 150. Id. at 859.  
 151. Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 286 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 152. See Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 126–27 (2003) (finding that the 
facility’s regulations were constitutionally valid).  
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penological goals.”153 The Court found that the regulations were 
aimed at promoting internal security because they aimed to reduce 
visitation, reduce the prevention of future crimes, and reduce the 
smuggling of illegal substances into the prison.154  
Second, the Court determined that the inmates had 
alternative means of engaging in communication.155 The Court 
stated that if alternative means did not exist, then the regulations 
would be unreasonable, but that that was not the case.156 The 
inmates could communicate with individuals that were not on the 
approved list by sending messages to them through those 
individuals that were on the approved list and by communicating 
by letter and telephone.157 In response to the respondents’ 
argument that phone calls are brief and expensive, the Court 
stated that “[a]lternatives to visitation need not be ideal . . . they 
need only be available.”158  
Third, the Court found that accommodating the respondents’ 
requests would cause a “significant reallocation of the prison 
system’s financial resources” and “would impair the ability of 
corrections officers to protect all who are inside a prison’s walls.”159 
The Court went on to state that “[w]hen such consequences are 
present, we are ‘particularly deferential’ to prison administrators’ 
regulatory judgments.”160 
Fourth, the Court found that respondents had not met the 
“high” standard of pointing to an “obvious regulatory alternative 
                                                                                                     
 153. See id. at 133–35 (“The regulations promote internal security, perhaps 
the most legitimate of penological goals, by reducing the total number of visits 
and by limiting the disruption caused by children in particular.”) (citations 
omitted).  
 154. See id. (focusing on the justifications for the ban).   
 155. See id. at 135 (“Here, the alternatives are of sufficient utility that they 
give some support to the regulations, particularly in a context where visitation is 
limited, not completely withdrawn.”).  
 156. See id. (“Were it shown that no alternative means of communication 
existed, though it would not be inclusive, it would be some evidence that the 
regulations were unreasonable. That showing, however, cannot be made.”).  
 157. See id. (“Although this option is not available to inmates barred all 
visitation after two violations, they and other inmates may communicate with 
persons outside the prison by letter and telephone.”). 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)).  
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that fully accommodates the asserted right while not imposing 
more than a de minimis cost to the valid penological goal.”161 In 
conclusion, the Court in Overton decided that the prison’s 
restrictions on visitation did not violate the respondent’s 
constitutional rights.162  
Because of a “history of upholding limitations on visitation and 
prisoner rights,”163 it is unlikely that U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Tennessee will find that the Knox County Jail 
violated the Constitution when it banned in-person visitation. The 
current case, however, is potentially distinguishable from Overton 
because it appears that some of the factors of the Turner test weigh 
in favor of the Knox County jail inmates.164 
As for the first factor, Knox County has stated that the focus 
of the ban on in-person visitation is to promote internal security by 
reducing visitor traffic and the amount of illegal substances 
entering the facility.165 The Supreme Court stated in Overton that 
                                                                                                     
 161. See id. at 136 (“[T]hese alternatives do not go so far toward 
accommodating the asserted right with so little cost to penological goals that they 
meet Turner’s high standard.”). 
 162. See id. at 126 (“The regulations satisfy each of four factors used to decide 
whether a prison regulation affecting a constitutional right that survives 
incarceration withstands constitutional challenge.”).  
 163. Chesa Boudin, Trevor Stutz & Aaron Littman, Prison Visitation Policies:   
A Fifty-State Survey, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 153 (2013). See also Ky. Dep’t 
of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 465 (1989) (holding that inmates do not have 
a liberty interest in receiving visitors that is entitled to the protections of the Due 
Process Clause); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984) (finding a jail’s 
blanket prohibition on contact visits to be constitutionally valid);  Macedon v. Cal. 
Dep’t of Corr., 67 F. App’x 407, 408 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment 
against an inmate’s challenge of the denial of family visits);  Newman v. Alabama, 
559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1997) (leaving visitation regulations to the discretion 
of prison administrators);  Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(“Prison inmates have no absolute constitutional right to visitation.”);  Ford v. 
Beister, 657 F. Supp 607, 611 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (“[T]he Constitution does not 
require that detainees be allowed contact visits . . . .”);  Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 
F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977) (allowing curtailment of visitation as punishment 
but recognizing First Amendment limits);  Craig v. Hocker, 405 F. Supp. 656, 674 
(D. Nev. 1975) (“So long as there are reasonable alternative means of 
communication, a prisoner has no First Amendment right to associate with 
whomever he sees fit.”). 
 164. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (setting forth a four-factor test).  
 165. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2 (“When the ban was initiated, 
the Sheriff’s Office gave the following reasons for eliminating in-person visits:  
Decreased visitation traffic—requires less staff[;] No contraband entering 
jail[;] . . . Lessens chances for violence . . . .”). 
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promoting internal security is the “most legitimate of penological 
goals.”166 Knox County has stated a legitimate penological goal, but 
its ban actually undermines that goal.167 The Court in Turner 
stated that the legitimate goal and the regulation cannot be “so 
remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.”168 Statistics 
show that the Knox County Jail’s ban on in-person visitation is 
actually making the prison less safe.169 Assaults within the prison 
have increased;  mental health issues haves arisen among the 
inmates;  and contraband flows into the prison at the same rate it 
did prior to the ban.170  
Additionally, the ban is excessive. The ban is overly broad 
because the jail, in its attempt to reduce contraband entering the 
facility, has taken away in-person visitation from all those 
detained, not just the ones who are a threat to bring contraband 
into the facility.171 The ban is simultaneously too narrow because 
it has not reduced the amount of contraband entering the facility, 
which means that the ban has not successfully targeted the sources 
of smuggled contraband.172 
Because Knox County Jail’s ban undermines the county’s 
legitimate penological goal and is excessive, it is arguable that the 
ban is not reasonably related to the county’s goal. Therefore, it is 
possible that the court will find that factor one weighs in favor of 
the plaintiffs.  
As for the second factor, the Knoxville County Jail has 
provided alternative methods of communication to Knox County 
inmates.173 Inmates can still communicate with family, friends, 
                                                                                                     
 166. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 127, 133 (2003). 
 167. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing how Knox County 
Jail’s ban on in-person visitation has made the facility less safe). 
 168. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90 (1987).  
 169. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (“The ban has made the jail 
less safe for both inmates and staff. The total rate of assaults increased by an 
average of one assault per 100 inmates after the ban was enacted in April 2014.”).  
 170. FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26 at 3, 6 (noting the rise in inmate-on-
inmate assaults as well as the drop in trust, intimacy, and social connection 
between inmates and visitors). 
 171. See KNOX COUNTY SHERIFF, supra note 5, at 2 (“Knox County Correctional 
Facilities use video visitation as the only method for personal visits.”). 
 172. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing Face to Face’s 
findings). 
 173. See Knox County Corrections Division, KNOX COUNTY, TENN. SHERIFF, 
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and others through video call, phone call, messaging, and by 
letter.174 These alternatives were sufficient in Overton, where the 
Court stated that “[a]lternatives to visitation need not be 
ideal . . . they need only be available.”175 Therefore, it is likely that 
factor two weighs in favor of Knox County.  
As for the third factor of the Turner test, it is unclear what the 
financial cost to the Knox County Jail would be. However, unlike 
in Overton, the impact of the accommodating the inmates’ request 
would not “impair the ability of corrections officers to protect all 
who are inside the prison’s walls.”176 Again, the ban on in-person 
visitation has made the jail less safe.177 Lifting the ban and 
returning in-person visitation back to the jail would likely assist 
the correctional officers in protecting the facility and those within 
it. Therefore, it is arguable that factor three weighs in favor of the 
plaintiffs.  
As for the fourth factor of the Turner test, it is likely that the 
plaintiffs can meet the “high” standard of pointing to an “obvious 
regulatory alternative that fully accommodates the asserted right 
while not imposing more than a de minimis cost to the valid 
penological goal”178 because reimplementing in-person visitation 
would arguably promote Knox County Jail’s legitimate penological 
goal by making the facility safer. Therefore, it is arguable that 
factor four weighs in the plaintiffs’ favor. 
In conclusion, because of the significant deference given to jail 
administrators by the courts,179 it will be difficult for the plaintiffs 
to prove that the Turner test’s four factors weigh in their favor. 
Still, it is arguable that Knox County’s ban is not rationally related 
                                                                                                     
http://www.knoxsheriff.org/jail/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (listing information 
for various methods of communication) [https://perma.cc/PW96-66G8]. 
 174. See id. (listing information on telephoning, messaging, and mailing a 
letter to an inmate in Knox County Jail).  
 175. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003). 
 176. Id.  
 177. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing Face to Face 
Knox’s findings).  
 178. Overton, 539 U.S. at 136 (2003).  
 179. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (“Prison administration is, 
moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility of those branches, 
and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Where a 
state penal system is involved, federal courts have . . . additional reason to accord 
deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”). 
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to its legitimate penological goal and that reinstating in-person 
visitation would more successfully further the county’s legitimate 
penological goal. 
2. Bell v. Wolfish Test 
As stated earlier, it is unlikely that a court would find that 
Knox County Jail’s ban on in-person visitation violates the First 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment regarding convicted 
detainees. However, the Supreme Court has applied a different 
test when determining if a facility’s regulations violate the 
constitutional rights of pretrial detainees.180  
In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court discussed the principles 
regarding rights of pretrial detainees and the standard of review 
courts must use in determining if a jail regulation violates the 
constitutional rights of pretrial detainees.181 In Wolfish, the 
plaintiffs filed a class action law suit in the Southern District of 
New York challenging the legality of conditions facing pretrial 
detainees in a New York City federal correctional facility.182 The 
plaintiffs challenged the Metropolitan Correctional Facility’s 
practice of putting two inmates in cells intended to house only one 
inmate, restrictions that required that inmates could only receive 
reading materials from approved publishers, room searches in the 
absence of the inmates, and required cavity searches.183  
The district court held that because the detainees are 
“presumed to be innocent and held only to ensure their presence at 
trial, ‘any deprivation or restriction of rights beyond those which 
are necessary for confinement alone, must be justified by a 
compelling necessity.’”184 Applying that rule, the court enjoined the 
                                                                                                     
 180. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 181. See id. at 520 (“In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or 
restrictions of pretrial detention that implicates only the protection against 
deprivation of liberty without due process of law, the proper inquiry is whether 
those conditions or restrictions amount to punishment of the detainee.”).  
 182. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977).  
 183. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 527 (“The petition served up a veritable potpourri 
of complaints that implicated virtually every facet of the institution’s conditions 
and practices.”). 
 184. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 
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double-bunking practice and the publisher-only rule on a partial 
motion for summary judgment.185 After trial, the court enjoined the 
practice of requiring inmates to expose their body cavities for 
visual inspection following contact visits and granted relief in favor 
of pretrial detainees with respect to the requirement that 
detainees remain outside their rooms during room inspection.186 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.187 
The Supreme Court addressed whether the conditions of 
confinement violated the individual liberty, due process, and 
privacy of pretrial detainees as protected by the First, Fourth, and 
Fifth Amendments through the Fourteenth Amendment.188  
The Supreme Court stated four principles regarding the rights 
of pretrial detainees.189 First, pre-trial detainees do not forfeit all 
constitutional protections by reason of their confinement.190 
Second, those rights are subject to restrictions and limitations.191 
Third, “maintaining institutional security and preserving internal 
order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation 
or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of . . . pretrial 
detainees.”192 Fourth, deference must be shown to the correctional 
facility’s officials, even when they have no expertise.193  
                                                                                                     
1977) (quoting Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 
392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 185. United States ex rel. Wolfish, 428 F. Supp. at 344  
To summarize:  Upon the cross motions before the court, petitioners 
are entitled to a partial decree enjoining (a) double celling, (b) 
enforcement of the “publishers only” rule, (c) failure to give receipts for 
seized property, and (d) the practices respecting mail hereinabove 
found to be invalid. 
 186. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 528 (1979) (discussing procedural 
history).  
 187. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978).  
 188. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 524 (“We granted certiorari to consider the 
important constitutional questions raised by these decisions and to resolve an 
apparent conflict among the Circuits.”).  
 189. See id. at 545 (“Our cases have established several general principles 
that inform our evaluation of the constitutionality of the restrictions at issue.”). 
 190. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974) (“There is no iron 
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.”). 
 191. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (“Lawful incarceration 
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and 
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying the penal system.”).   
 192. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).  
 193. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (“Such considerations are 
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The Supreme Court stated that the essential objectives of 
pretrial confinement are ensuring that the detainee is present at 
trial and effectively managing the detention facility once the 
individual is confined.194 Where an individual is lawfully 
committed to pretrial detention, “the Government concededly may 
detain him to ensure his presence at trial and may subject him to 
the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as 
those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or 
otherwise violate the Constitution.”195  
The Supreme Court also discussed the test that courts must 
apply when determining whether a jail’s regulation violates 
constitutional rights of pretrial detainees.196 Where there is no 
showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of the 
correctional facility, the court must determine whether the Court 
has a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and whether 
the challenged policy is rationally related to that purpose.197 
Therefore, “if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial 
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental 
objective, it does not, without more, amount to punishment.”198 If, 
however, the restriction is not reasonably related to a legitimate 
goal because it is “excessive,”199 “arbitrary,”200 or “purposeless,”201 
then the court can infer that the purpose of the governmental 
                                                                                                     
peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, 
and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the 
officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should 
ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.”).  
 194. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 539–40 (“[W]e do not accept respondents’ argument 
that the Government’s interest in ensuring a detainee’s presence at trial is the 
only objective that may justify restraints and conditions once the decision is 
lawfully made to confine a person.”).  
 195. Id. at 536–37.  
 196. See id. at 561 (discussing the Bell v. Wolfish test). 
 197. See id. (“Therefore, the determination whether these restrictions and 
practices constitute punishment in the constitutional sense depends on whether 
they are rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and 
whether they appear excessive in relation to that purpose.”).  
 198. Id. at 539.  
 199. Id. at 561.  
 200. Id. at 539. 
 201. Id. 
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action is punishment and cannot constitutionally be inflicted on 
the pretrial detainees.202 
The Court found that the double-bunking practice,203 the 
publisher-only rule,204 the practice of searching rooms in absence 
of the pretrial detainees,205 and the practice of performing cavity 
searches after contact visitation206 did not amount to punishment 
of the pretrial detainees.207 The Court held that each challenged 
policy was supported by a legitimate government interest, which 
was ensuring security and order, and that the challenged policies 
were reasonably related to that purpose.208 The Court held that 
courts must rely on facilities’ judgment calls, which are “confided 
to officials outside of the Judicial Branch of Government.”209  
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether a 
jail’s blanket prohibition of in-person visitation violates the 
constitutional rights of pre-trial detainees, in Block v. 
Rutherford,210 it addressed whether a jail’s blanket prohibition of 
contact visitation violates pretrial detainees’ constitutional 
rights.211 The Supreme Court considered whether a county jail’s 
blanket prohibition of contact visitation between pre-trial 
detainees and their spouses, relatives, children, and friends, was 
constitutionally valid.212 The plaintiffs in Block brought a class 
                                                                                                     
 202. See id. (“Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related 
to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may 
infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not 
constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.”).  
 203. Id. at 541–43. 
 204. Id. at 548–52. 
 205. Id. at 555–57. 
 206. Id. at 558–60. 
 207. Id. at 562. 
 208. See id. at 561 (“Ensuring security and order at the institution is a 
permissible nonpunitive objective, whether the facility houses pretrial detainees, 
convicted detainees, or both.”). 
 209. Id. at 562. 
 210. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 591 (1984) (finding that pretrial 
detainees do not have a constitutional right to contact visitation).  
 211. See id. at 586 (“[O]ur inquiry is simply whether petitioners’ blanket 
prohibition on contact visits at Central Jail is reasonably related to the security 
of that facility.”). 
 212. See id. (“The question before us, therefore, is narrow:  whether the 
prohibition of contact visits is reasonably related to legitimate governmental 
objectives.”). 
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action suit against the Los Angeles County Jail challenging its ban 
on contact visitation.213 The jail claimed that its ban was based on 
the need to reduce the introduction of contraband and weapons 
into the facility.214  
The United States District Court for the Central District of 
California found for the plaintiffs and agreed that “the ability of a 
man to embrace his wife and children from time to time during the 
weeks or months while he is awaiting trial is a matter of great 
importance to him.”215 The court held that the county jail’s ban on 
contact visitation was “‘excessive’ in relation to the underlying 
security objectives” and characterized the jail’s rejection of all 
proposals for contact visitation as an “unreasonable fixation upon 
security.”216 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed, suggesting that a “blanket prohibition of contact 
visits for all detainees would be an unreasonable, exaggerated 
response to security concerns . . . .”217  
The Supreme Court disagreed and held that “the Constitution 
does not require that detainees be allowed contact visits when 
responsible, experienced administrators have determined, in their 
sound discretion, that such visits will jeopardize the security of the 
facility.”218 The Court held that the ban was supported by the 
government’s legitimate interest to keep weapons and contraband 
from being smuggled into the county jail by visitors and that the 
ban was not excessive.219  
Similar to what is stated in Section V.C.1 of this Note, it is 
unlikely that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District on 
Tennessee will find that Knox County’s ban on in-person visitation 
violates the constitutional rights of pretrial detainee plaintiffs 
                                                                                                     
 213. See id. at 576 (“Respondents, pretrial detainees at the Los Angeles 
County Central Jail, brought a class action in Federal District Court against the 
County Sheriff and other officials, challenging, on due process grounds, the jail's 
policy of denying pretrial detainees contact visits . . . .”). 
 214. See id. at 586 (“[T]here is no dispute that internal security of detention 
facilities is a legitimate governmental interest .  . . .”). 
 215. Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104, 110 (C.D. Cal. 1978). 
 216. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 581 (1984). 
 217. Rutherford v. Pitchess, 710 F.2d 572, 577 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 218. Block, 468 U.S. at 589. 
 219. See id. at 588 (“In sum, we conclude that petitioners’ blanket prohibition 
is an entirely reasonable, nonpunitive response to the legitimate security 
concerns identified, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
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because, under the test established in Bell v. Wolfish, courts give 
significant deference to the jail administration.220 
The first prong to address is whether Knox County Jail had a 
legitimate government purpose when it created its ban against 
in-person visitation.221 Knox County Jail claims that the purpose 
of its ban on in-person visitation is to increase the security of the 
facility and reduce contraband entering the facility.222 Because this 
claimed purpose is the same as the one in Overton v. Bazzetta,223 
Block v. Rutherford,224 and Bell v. Wolfish,225 the purpose is a 
legitimate government interest. 
The next prong to address is whether the ban on in-person 
visitation is rationally related to the government’s legitimate 
purpose of reducing contraband and increasing the facility’s 
security.226 It is arguable that the ban is not rationally related to 
the government’s purpose of increasing the facility’s security. 
Statistics show that since the ban was implemented, assaults 
within the jail have increased;  that the mental health of the jail’s 
                                                                                                     
 220. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) 
[P]roblems that arise in the day-to-day operations of a corrections 
facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison 
administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the 
adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment 
are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and maintain 
institutional security. 
 221. See id. at 561 (“Therefore, the determination whether these restrictions 
and practices constitute punishment in the constitutional sense depends on 
whether they are rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental 
purpose . . . .”). 
 222. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2 (“When the ban was initiated, 
the Sheriff’s Office gave the following reasons for eliminating in-person visits:  
Decreased visitation traffic—requires less staff[;] No contraband entering 
jail[;] . . . Lessens chances for violence . . . .”). 
 223. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) (“The regulations 
promote internal security, perhaps the most legitimate of penological goals . . . .”). 
 224. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984) (“[T]here is no dispute 
that internal security of detention facilities is a legitimate governmental interest 
. . . .”). 
 225. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 561 (“Ensuring security and order at the institution 
is a permissible nonpunitive objective, whether the facility houses pretrial 
detainees, convicted inmates, or both.”). 
 226. See id. (“Therefore, the determination whether these restrictions and 
practices constitute punishment in the constitutional sense depends on whether 
they are rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and 
whether they appear excessive in relation to that purpose.”).  
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inmates has worsened;  and that contraband has continued to flow 
into the jail at same rate as it did prior to the ban.227 Additionally, 
the ban is excessive because it is simultaneously too broad and too 
narrow. It targets those who are not responsible for smuggling in 
contraband while simultaneously not being able to prevent those 
who are smuggling contraband into the facility from doing so.228  
Because of the “wide-ranging deference”229 courts give jail 
administrators, it is difficult for plaintiffs to prove that a 
correctional facility has not met the requirement of the Bell v. 
Wolfish Test.230 However, because the plaintiffs in this case can 
demonstrate that Knox County Jail’s legitimate government 
interest was not rationally related to its ban and was excessive, 
then there is a chance that the plaintiffs can prove that the Knox 
County Jail’s ban on in-person visitation constituted punishment.  
D. Does Knox County’s Ban on In-Person Visitation Violate the 
Eighth Amendment’s Protection Against Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment? 
The Eighth Amendment states, “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”231 The Eighth Amendment also imposes 
duties on prison officials to “provide humane conditions of 
confinement;” “ensure that inmates receive adequate food, 
                                                                                                     
 227. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing Face to Face 
Knox’s findings). 
 228. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing the lack of change 
in the amount of contraband entering the jail after the ban of in-person visitation). 
 229. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“Prison administrators 
therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and 
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve 
internal order and discipline and maintain institutional security.”).  
 230. See id. at 547–48 (“Such considerations are peculiarly within the 
province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of 
substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated 
their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their 
expert judgment in such matters.” quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 
(1974)).  
 231. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  
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clothing, shelter, and medical care;” and “take reasonable 
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”232  
To determine whether the government has violated the Eighth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has applied a different test than 
the Turner v. Safley test.233 In Overton, prisoners claimed that the 
restriction on visitation for inmates that had two substance-abuse 
violations violated the Eighth Amendment because it was a “cruel 
and unusual condition of confinement in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.”234 The Supreme Court held that although the 
restriction “undoubtedly [made] the prisoner’s confinement more 
difficult to bear,” it did not fail to meet the standards mandated by 
the Eighth Amendment.235 The Court stated that the withdrawal 
of privileges for a limited period as means of effecting prison 
discipline is not a “dramatic departure from accepted standards for 
conditions of confinement.”236 The Court also stated that the 
restriction did not create inhumane prison conditions; did not 
deprive inmates of basic necessities; did not fail to protect the 
inmates’ health or safety; and did not involve the infliction of pain 
or injury, or deliberate indifference to the risk that it might 
occur.237 However, the Court suggested that “if the withdrawal of 
all visitation privileges were permanent or for a much longer 
period, or if it were applied in an arbitrary manner to a particular 
inmate, the case would present different considerations.”238 
In their book Prisoners’ Self-Help Litigation Manual, authors 
John Boston and Daniel Manville claim that courts have been more 
sympathetic to inmates confined in county jails with “extremely 
                                                                                                     
 232. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).  
 233. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136 (2003) (avoiding application 
of the Turner test to the cruel and unusual punishment context). 
 234. Id.  
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 137. 
 237. See id. (listing additional considerations).  
 238. Id.  
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limited visiting opportunities.”239 In Jackson v. Gardner,240 the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee 
ruled that the Sullivan County Jail violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.241 One of the conditions that led to this finding was 
that inmates were limited to only one non-contact visit per week 
with blood relatives for fifteen minutes.242 In response, the district 
court ordered that the Sullivan County Jail increase visitation for 
its inmates.243 
Additionally, in Laaman v. Helgemre,244 the district court 
determined that extreme limitations on the right to visitation can 
“threaten the mental and emotional stability of the inmates.”245 
The court ruled that a state violates the Eighth Amendment when 
its visitation policy fails “to allow inmates to keep their community 
and family bonds,” which would “promote[ ] degeneration” and 
“decrease[ ] [inmates] chances of successful integration into 
society.”246  
                                                                                                     
 239. JOHN BOSTON & DANIEL E. MANVILLE, PRISONER’S SELF-HELP LITIGATION 
MANUAL 221 (4th ed. 2010);  see also Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 626–27 
(5th Cir. 1985) (requiring weekend visits);  Jackson v. Gardner, 639 F. Supp. 1005, 
1012 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (requiring increased visits);  McMurry v. Phelps, 533 F. 
Supp. 742, 764 (W.D. La. 1982) (finding that thirty minutes of visitation per week 
was inadequate, requiring hours accessible to workers, and condemning lack of 
privacy and difficulty seeing or hearing);  Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252, 
1309 (S.D. W. Va. 1981) (ordering corrections to obstructions of sight and 
hearing); Nicholson v. Choctaw County, 498 F. Supp. 295, 310 (S.D. Ala. 1980) 
(finding that two sessions of two hours of visitation weekly were inadequate and 
requiring weekend, evening, and holiday visits).  
 240. See Jackson v. Gardner, 639 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (“The 
Court finds, from the facts outlined above that the conditions of confinement at 
the Sullivan County Jail violate the rights of those confined to be free from cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 241. See id. at 1010 (stating that whether prison conditions amount to cruel 
and unusual punishment must be determined “from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”). 
 242. See id. at 1008 (“The majority    . are allowed only one non-contact visit 
per week for fifteen minutes. This single weekly visit is limited to blood 
relatives.”).  
 243. See id. at 1012 (“[V]isitation must be increased .   . ..”).  
 244. See Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977) (finding 
that a total denial of visitation would violate the Constitution). 
 245. Id. at 321. 
 246. Id. at 320.  
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The ban at the Knox County Jail has caused Knox County 
inmates to suffer from mental health issues,247 it has increased 
violence within the facility,248 and it has disrupted inmate’s ability 
to keep their community and family bonds.249 Also, it is arguable 
that the ban does permanently withdrawal all visitation from the 
inmates because the video visitation they are provided is 
insufficient and is inferior when compared to in-person 
visitation.250 Therefore, the plaintiffs can possibly successfully 
argue that Knox County’s ban violates the Eighth Amendment 
regarding convicted detainees located within the jail.  
It is unnecessary to consider whether Knox County’s ban 
violates the Eighth Amendment regarding pretrial detainees 
because any punishment of a pretrial detainee is prohibited.251  
VI. Alternative Challenges to Bans on In-Person Visitation 
Because of the difficulty of succeeding on constitutional 
challenges, the most effective path to defeating bans on in-person 
visitation is by individuals and organizations persuading 
administrative agencies and legislatures to abandon and avoid 
policies that ban in-person visitation. Several state legislatures 
have made attempts to enact legislation prohibiting bans on 
in-person visitation.  
                                                                                                     
 247. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the mental 
and physical deterioration of Alonzo Hoskins).  
 248. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing the rise in 
assaults). 
 249. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7 at 8 
The stress of being cut off from his family and the living conditions he 
is forced to endure at the Knox county Facilities have caused him to 
lose weight, lose hair, have difficulty sleeping, and caused him to suffer 
from depression and mental health issues so severe that he requires 
medication. 
 250. See Widra, supra note 71 (“While there are benefits to video 
communication, primarily regarding long-distance communication, psychologists 
have repeatedly found numerous differences between face-to-face and video 
communication.”). 
 251. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979) (“[T]he Government 
concededly may detain [a pretrial detainee] to ensure his presence at trial and 
may subject him to the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long 
as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise 
violate the Constitution.”). 
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In 2015, the Texas state legislature passed House Bill 549, 
which requires county jails in the state to provide incarcerated 
people with a minimum of two twenty-minute in-person visits per 
week, with exceptions for counties that, as of September 1, 2015, 
have “incurred significant design, engineering or construction 
costs to provide visitation that does not comply with a rule or 
procedure adopted under Subsection (a)(20), or does not have the 
physical plant capability to provide the in-person prison visitation 
required by a rule or procedure adopted under Subsection 
(a)(20).”252  
In California’s state legislature, state senator Holly Mitchell 
recently led the charge to pass Senate Bill 1157, Strengthening 
Family Connections.253 That bill would have protected in-person 
visitation rights in California county jails and guaranteed that 
video visitation did not replace in-person visitation.254 
Unfortunately, it was vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown because “a 
statutory mandate on local jail operations would be too 
inflexible.”255 The California state legislature, however, remains 
undeterred. In February 2019, Assembly Member Jose Medina 
introduced AB-964, which “would require all local detention 
facilities to offer in-person visitation” and would “give any facility 
that does not offer in-person visitation until January 1, 2025, to 
comply with this requirement.”256 
There have also been efforts in Congress to challenge bans on 
in-person visitation.257 U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth 
                                                                                                     
 252. H.R. 549, 2015, Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015). 
 253. See Strengthening Family Connections in California, NATION INSIDE, 
https://nationinside.org/campaign/strengthening-family-connections/ (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2019) (“The mission of the Strengthening Family Connections:  In-Person 
Visitation Campaign is to pass SB 1157 in California, introduced by California 
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California county jails, ensuring that video visitation cannot replace in-person 
visitation.”) [https://perma.cc/2BQ7-8DJR]. 
 254. See id. (stating the bill’s mission). 
 255. The Times Editorial Board, Editorial, Banning In-Person Jail Visits is 
Foolish and Needlessly Cruel, L.A. TIMES (May 30, 2017, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-video-jail-visits-20170530-
story.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/XPT7-W7V9].  
 256. Assemb. B. 964, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 257. H.R.6441—Video Visitation in Prisons Act of 2016, CONGRESS.GOV (Dec. 
6, 2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/6441/text (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/XX48-YQ5W]. 
378 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 339 (2019) 
introduced the Video Visitation in Prisons Act of 2016, which is 
currently navigating through the federal legislative process.258 
That Act would require the Federal Communications Commission 
to regulate video visits and the Federal Bureau of Prisons to 
continue to provide in-person visitation and only use video services 
as a supplement to in-person visitation.259  
In addition to legislative attempts to prohibit bans on 
in-person visitation, some county jail administrators have made 
the decision to abandon the bans. On April 19, 2016, the Travis 
County Jail in Texas, which was included in the exemption 
provision of Texas’s prohibition on bans on in-person visitation, 
ended its video-only visitation policy.260 Only a few days later, on 
April 22, the Adams County Jail in Mississippi abandoned its 
Homewav video visitation program in favor of a traditional jail 
visitation program.261 Adams County Sheriff Travis Patten stated, 
“A lot of people couldn’t afford those [video] calls. . . . We know that 
if someone is in the jail they’ve done something to be there, but I 
think everybody should have the right to check in on their child 
and make sure they’re ok.”262 On January 16, 2019, the sheriff for 
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, Gary McFadden, kept his 
campaign promise and abandoned the county’s ban on in-person 
visitation.263 Sheriff McFadden stated that in-person visitation 
                                                                                                     
 258. See id. (“Latest Action: House—12/22/2016, Referred to the 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations.”). 
 259. See id. (creating “[a] prohibition against a provider of a covered service 
requiring a correctional facility to restrict in-person visitation as a condition of 
providing such service in such facility”). 
 260. See Alison Walsh, In-Person Visits Return to Jails in Travis County, 
Texas, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 19, 2016), 
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 261. See Vershal Hogan, Sheriff to Discontinue Video Visitation at Jail, THE 
NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT (Apr. 22, 2016), 
https://www.natchezdemocrat.com/2016/04/22/sheriff-to-discontinue-video-
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 262. Id. 
 263. See In-Person Visitations Restored at Mecklenburg County Jails, Sheriff’s 
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improves public safety, reduces recidivism, and reduces the 
likelihood that an inmate will commit an infraction inside of the 
jail.264  
Going forward, whether bans on in-person visitation will 
remain in place or be abandoned greatly depends on the efforts of 
individuals and organizations persuading their state and federal 
law makers to prohibit the bans.  
VII. Conclusion 
Where correctional facilities, such as the Knox County Jail, 
create bans on in-person visitation and replace it with video 
visitation, the inmates and their families suffer. These bans 
increase mental distress,265 recidivism rates,266 and financial 
hardships,267 while also bringing in lucrative commissions268 for 
the facilities that enact them.269 Because of these burdens, it is 
imperative that individuals and organizations come forward to 
challenge these bans.  
                                                                                                     
Office Says, WFAE 90.7 (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.wfae.org/post/person-
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Because of the “wide ranging deference”270 given to 
correctional facility administrators, it is unlikely that the plaintiffs 
will be successful on constitutional challenges to these bans.271 The 
bans, however, can be successfully defeated through the political 
process by individuals and organizations persuading their 
legislatures and administrative agencies to provide inmates with 
access to in-person visitation. 
                                                                                                     
 270. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1974) (“Prison administrators 
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